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Abstract  
This article discusses the migration processes and brokering practices that link 
Ethiopia and Sudan by taking into account the social, economic, political and 
cultural underpinnings of human smuggling in the region. The analysis is based 
on three months of fieldwork using a conventional qualitative research 
methodology. Respondents were selected from actors such as smugglers, 
migrants and government personnel involved in the migration process, 
facilitation and control activities. Since the 1990s, significant irregular overland 
labour migration has emerged from Ethiopian towns and villages to Khartoum, 
Sudan via the border towns of Metema on the Ethiopian side and Galabat on the 
Sudanese side. However, how various actors engage in shaping this migration 
process and how human smuggling sustains despite increasing control efforts by 
the state is less understood. This paper demonstrates that this mobility is 
facilitated mainly by smugglers who are involved in transnational social 
relations, material practice and migration knowledge production, including 
informal money transfer practices, transport and communication 
infrastructures. This challenges the view reflected in popular discourses that 
such smuggling is organised by independent criminal organisations. Smugglers 
and their connectors in Metema facilitate Ethiopian migrants’ clandestine 
border crossings via the town of Metema by mobilising support and resources 
from local communities along the border, bribing border guards and capitalising 
on their ethnic, religious and economic connections along Ethiopian-Sudanese 
borderlands. The study concludes that human smuggling and brokering 
migration partly thrives in the border areas since the actors extend benefits of 
smuggling to the economically disadvantaged local community and in return 
generate social and community support for smuggling activities. 
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Introduction 
In recent decades, Ethiopia has simultaneously become one of the major 
sending and transit countries of migrants and asylum seekers in the Horn of 
Africa (Ayalew, 2017; Zewdu, 2018). In the face of challenging socioeconomic 
and political conditions in the country, which are compounded by very limited 
options for legal international migration, a large number of Ethiopian young 
men and women undertake long and dangerous overland journeys across 
deserts and seas to reach destination countries in Europe, the Middle East and 
southern parts of Africa. The mobility of migrants is organised by the 
engagement and interactions of multiple actors and the entanglement of social 
and smuggling networks that link migration origin, transit and destination 
places (ILO, 2011; Ayalew, 2017; Fernandez, 2017). The focus of this paper is 
socio-political and cultural dimensions of smuggling of Ethiopian migrants to 
Sudan along the north-western route, which links villages and towns in 
Ethiopia to Khartoum, via the town of Metema, which is located along the 
Ethiopian-Sudanese border. This route leads to Europe via the eastern Sahara 
Desert, Libya and the Mediterranean Sea.   
Migration through this route to Sudan and further north is not a recent 
phenomenon. The mass flow of people through the town of Metema was 
observed during the Dergue regime due to famine, civil war and the repressive 
political rule in Ethiopia (Terrazas, 2007; Faiz, 2013; Hailemichael, 2014; 
Grabska, 2016). However, since the 1990s, after the current Ethiopian regime 
took power and the emergence of a booming oil economy in Sudan, Ethiopian 
labour migration to Sudan has shown a marked increase. Most of these border 
crossings are clandestine and thousands of young men and women cross the 
Ethiopian-Sudanese border every month (Triulzi & Mckenzie, 2013; Zeyneba, 
2017; Ayalew, 2017). In Khartoum, women migrants face sexual, physical and 
labour abuses by employers and significant other actors. Many new arrivals 
often use Khartoum as a steppingstone and proceed towards European 
countries that are assumed to be welcoming of refugees and migrants (Triulzi, 
2013).  
After the Ethiopian government recently intensified control infrastructures 
and introduced tough anti-human smuggling regulations to control 
clandestine migration, the actors and practices of facilitating overland 
migration and clandestine crossing of international borders have become 
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more complex than before. In this paper, we will trace the role of state, private 
and community actors in facilitating the smuggling of Ethiopian migrants to 
Sudan. The existing studies focus on how criminal organisations, such as 
human traffickers and armed gangs, stationed along this migration route 
deceive migrants and how professional smugglers independently organise 
clandestine migratory journeys and border crossings (Abebaw, 2013; Triulzi 
& Mckenzie, 2013; Treiber, 2013b; Hailemichael, 2014; Habte, 2015; Collyer, 
2015). Migrants, mainly women, are also portrayed as silent victims of various 
types of sexual, labour and physical abuses by trafficking rings and smuggling 
operations (Fernandez, 2010; Guday & Kiya, 2013; Asnake & Zerihun, 2015; 
Grabska, 2016; Zeyneba, 2017).  
Of course, there are interesting emerging studies on the conditions of 
migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, Dinbabo and Nyasulu (2015) 
explored macroeconomic determinants of pull factors of international 
migration to South Africa and Dinbabo and Carciotto (2015) dealt with the 
necessity of a rights-based approach in international migration studies. 
However, less understood is the manner in which smuggling becomes a 
community enterprise – as it involves ordinary individuals, state actors and 
business people – and is embedded in cross-border informal trade and social 
relations in borderland areas. Furthermore, little is known about how 
migration facilitation actors sustain clandestine migration by dynamically and 
creatively responding and adapting to the intensification of irregular 
migration control and states’ regulatory structures. Thus, this paper tries to 
fill this knowledge gap by exploring the intersection of social and smuggling 
networks in organising clandestine migratory exits and journeys; socio-
cultural dimensions of brokerage and smuggling organisations.  
This study was conducted mainly in the transit town of Metema, which is about 
196 kilometres away from Gonder and 975 kilometres from the capital, Addis 
Ababa. This town is a major node of smuggling and social networks that 
connect villages and towns in Ethiopia to Khartoum, Sudan. A major source of 
livelihoods is cross-border trade with the town of Galabat on the Sudanese 
side of the border. The town’s economy is predominantly based on trade and 
service, which is related to the large numbers of migrants. The rural parts of 
the districts on both sides of the border have agricultural investments. 
Especially on the Sudanese side, there are large-scale plantations that play a 
major role in attracting labour migrants from Ethiopia. The study was also 
conducted in three major migrant sending locations in Ethiopia: Addis Ababa, 
Hadiya Zone in Southern Ethiopia and South Wallo Zone in Northern Ethiopia.  
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Background/Contextualisation 
Ethiopian migration to Sudan is not a new phenomenon. There was significant 
refugee flow from Ethiopia to Sudan during the Ethiopian military regime 
(1974–1991) due to military dictatorship, civil wars, poverty and 
environmental disasters, such as droughts (Terrazas, 2007; Faiz, 2013; 
Hailemichael, 2014; Grabska, 2016). According to Bariagaber (2006), political 
conflict and war with Eritrea led to the displacement of thousands who 
migrated to the Sudan. According to Grabska (2016), these migrants of the 
1980s and 1990s were labelled as refugees, unlike the present cohort who are 
predominantly economic migrants. Faiz (2013) also states that the existence 
of petroleum since the 1990s and the economic boom afterwards attracted 
many economic migrants to the country, including Ethiopians. With the 
downfall of the military regime, the former refugees were repatriated to 
Ethiopia, and resettled in the border town of Metema. Many of those who 
remained in Sudan settled in Khartoum and continued to supply information 
to prospective migrants about ways of clandestine border crossings, meeting 
the brokers, as well as financial and psychological support for new arrivals via 
transnational and translocal social and family networks that connect the 
origin, transit and destination locations in this migration corridor (Treiber, 
2013a; Ayalew, 2017).  
In addition, the longstanding migration history between the two countries, the 
cultural similarity and the loose and vast common border encouraged 
migrants to use the north-west route to the Sudan. However, recently, 
migration patterns have become complex in terms of who is migrating, how 
and why. There are different estimations but no exact data on the number of 
migrants crossing the border clandestinely. For instance, in 2011, the ILO 
reported that the number of Ethiopian migrants travelling to Libya through 
Sudan was around 75,000–100,000 per year (Anteneh, 2011). In 2014, the 
number of migrants using the north-west route was reported to be 18,000–
37,000 per year (Frouws, 2014). Based on her source from the Ethiopian 
Immigration Office in Metema, Zeyneba (2017) puts the annual estimate at 
30,000–32,400 migrants. Despite such statistics and the significant flow of 
Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali migrants, little is known about migration 
patterns and process along this route (RMMS, 2014; Ayalew, 2017). Extreme 
mobility of migrants in the Sudan, Egypt, Libya and further in Europe make it 
difficult to track the migration flow, processes and map out the routes that take 
migrants outside of Ethiopia. Destinations are also varied as some stay in 
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Sudan, Libya and Egypt while others continue their journey to Europe 
(Ayalew, 2017).  
Despite reports of abuse and harassment in Sudan, the majority of migrants 
taking the north-west route are women. According to Zeyneba (2017), 
between September 2014 and August 2015, 193 migrants were caught trying 
to cross into the Sudan. Of this, 123 (63.73%) were female migrants. Faiz 
(2013) further claimed that the number of illegal female migrants to Sudan has 
increased after the 2013 ban on labour migration to the Middle East by the 
Ethiopian government. Studies show that Ethiopian women leave the country 
in search of better livelihoods (Shewit, 2013; Hailemichael, 2014). The 
Metema route, according to Anteneh (2011) and Jamie (2013), thus mainly 
served as a route for women migrants to Sudan for the purpose of domestic 
work. In Sudan, Ethiopian women are engaged in selling tea and coffee on the 
streets and sometimes in commercial sex work (Anteneh, 2011; Shewit, 2013; 
Zeyneba, 2017). Female Ethiopian migrants face several problems, including 
physical and sexual abuse (Faiz, 2013; Shewit, 2013; Addis, 2014; Frouws, 
2014; Hailemichael, 2014; Grabska, 2016; Tsega, 2016; Zeyneba, 2017). In 
many cases, according to Shewit (2013) and Faiz (2013), the women are faced 
with long working hours, restricted mobility and verbal abuse. They are also 
stereotyped and wrongly perceived as thieves and prostitutes in Sudan 
(Shewit, 2013; Ayalew, 2017).  
Looking further into the demography of migrants taking the north-west route, 
it is reported that many of the migrants are young Ethiopians and many male 
migrants look forward to reaching Europe through Libya and Egypt 
(Kuschminder & Siegel, 2012; Frouws, 2014; Strachan, 2016). In terms of 
ethnicity, they are mainly from Oromiya and Southern Nations Nationalities 
and People Regional States (Faiz, 2013; Zeyneba, 2017). This might be due to 
geographic proximity and the history of migration to Sudan from these 
regions. 
High-risk border crossings and long journeys of migrants and refugees from 
Ethiopia must be understood in the local and global context of a socio-political 
economy. On the sending side, young people in Ethiopia are dissatisfied with 
the growing economic inequalities, prolonged conflicts and repressive 
political conditions (Ayalew, 2017). At the same time, they are lured by 
remittances and returnees’ prosperity and driven by social and familial 
expectations. Undoubtedly, there is evidence of state persecutions and human 
right violations, particularly in the last two decades in Ethiopia, that drive an 
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increasing number of refugee flights, mainly from Oromyia National and 
Regional State of Ethiopia. Many of the migrants use Khartoum as a 
steppingstone to move to Europe, where they can seek asylum in refugee 
welcoming countries such as Germany and Sweden (Triulzi, 2013; Campbell, 
2014; Ayalew, 2017). However, there are also several other personal factors 
that drive migrants, such as adventure-seeking dreams, escape from forced 
marriages in the case of women and failures at school. Moreover, there are 
intermediaries and smugglers, commonly referred to as delaloch in Ethiopia, 
and several other actors who engage in organising departure and mobility. The 
delaloch also arrange debts for poor migrants so that they can travel now but 
pay later after they get jobs in Sudan. Thus, the combination of complex and 
dynamic macro (structural), meso (social and smuggling networks) and micro 
(individual) factors (Faist, 2000) shape the migratory experience in Ethiopia. 
Conceptual Frameworks  
Migration Industry  
There is growing literature that makes use of term ‘migration industry’ to 
describe the globalised phenomena of migration and the various actors that 
make it possible. Since the late 1990s, the concept was introduced to explain 
“how migration flows sustained themselves in the face of intensified efforts of 
states to control movement across territorial boundaries” (Spener, 2009). 
Following the pioneering work of Salt and Stein (1997), migration scholars 
have broadened the concept of the ‘migration industry’ to explain actors and 
processes involved in border controls and those facilitating contemporary 
irregular and regular labour and refugee mobility, particularly from the Global 
South to the Global North (Sørensen & Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013; Andersson, 
2014).  
The migration industry comprises of actors, technologies and enterprises that 
encourage, facilitate, mediate, condition, and control migration, cutting across 
both the social relations and material economy. These include recruitment and 
travel agencies, money lenders, formal and informal remittance and courier 
services, transport companies and operators, legal and advisory firms, visa 
facilitation agencies, lawyers, security contractors, smugglers, NGOs and 
others (Spener, 2009; Hernández-León, 2008; Sørensen & Gammeltoft-
Hansen, 2013; Xiang & Lindquist, 2014). According to Sørensen and 
Gammeltoft-Hansen (2013), the migration industry further encompasses 
human smuggling and trafficking networks, transnational criminal 
organisations, trafficking rings, and ‘control providers’, such as private 
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contractors performing immigration checks, operating detention centers 
and/or carrying out forced returns. According to Sørensen and Gammeltoft-
Hansen’s (2013) study, the involvement of these different institutions, 
individuals, and agents in the migration industry is believed to be driven by 
financial gain, emphasising the “commercialization of migration”. This study 
noted that these various actors maximise and accumulate huge economic gains 
by capitalising on migrants’ desire to move and the states’ increasing efforts 
to manage migratory mobility. In fact, for Sørensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 
(2013), it is the state that “actively sustains and funds large parts of the 
migration industry”, which indicates the involvement of not only market 
actors in the migration industry but also the intersection of market and state.  
However, due to the pronounced “business” domain in the concept of the 
migration industry, scholars centred their points of discussion on the “illegal” 
end of it, and argue that “human smuggling and trafficking” are salient 
elements of the migration industry (Salt & Stein, 1997; Castel & Miller, 2003). 
Later encompassing the social relation in migration networks, the concept of 
the migration industry was further developed into a business that can also 
“emerge from mutually-supportive networks of social relations within a 
migrant community” (Spener, 2009: 26).  
From Migration Industry to Migration Infrastructure 
Over time, literature on the migration industry has moved away from Salt and 
Stein’s (1997) notion of “migration businesses” towards considering 
migration infrastructure (Hernández-León, 2008; Sørensen & Gammeltoft-
Hansen, 2013; Xiang & Lindquist, 2014). These infrastructures, according to 
Xiang and Lindquist (2014: 124), can be divided into five dimensions evident 
in every step of the migration process. These are (1) the commercial 
(recruitment intermediaries), (2) the regulatory (state apparatus and 
procedures for documentation, licensing, training and other purposes), (3) the 
technological (communication and transport), (4) the humanitarian (NGOs 
and international organisations) and (5) the social (migrant networks). These 
dimensions entail that the concept of the migration industry not only deals 
with micro and macro structures but rather offers a meso-structure approach 
to migration. 
However, as Hernández-León (2008) argues, the migrant has long been left 
out of this concept of the migration industry, which pays little attention to 
migrants’ active and passive agency in mobilising migration resources and the 
diverse and dynamic relationships that emerge between migrants and brokers 
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(Herman, 2006; Sanchez, 2015; Ayalew, 2018). It also lacks the existential and 
emotional dimensions of migration. To address this shortcoming, 
Schapendonk (2018: 665) adds to the definition of the migration industry by 
incorporating relationalities and social negotiation with a focus on how 
migrants navigate the industry and how their practices “relate to, and are 
entangled with, a wider web of relations.” This emphasises the multi-scalar, 
relational nature of migration and its embeddedness in the social context.  
The literature on the migration industry also fails to incorporate the 
fundamental gender relations that shape and are reshaped by migration. 
Ethnic background and age group also determine the migration experience 
and process. Moreover, how migrants and brokers create and use networks by 
capitalising on shared nationality, ethnicity, religion and hometowns during 
organising fragmented and stepwise migratory journeys is overlooked 
(Ayalew, 2018). It is these missing elements in the migration industry 
literature that the present paper takes into account.  
According to Spener (2009), it has proven difficult to define the scope of the 
industry, a complex landscape with diverse actors and shifting roles. This 
point is reiterated by Schapendonk (2018). Furthermore, according to Spener 
(2009:18), there is a “problem of how we establish the conceptual boundaries 
of the migration industry” either as an analytical concept or a metaphorical 
representation. Nevertheless, the concept of the migration industry has 
proven to be an approach that enhances our understanding of migration as a 
multi-level process that involves different actors.  
Taking this into consideration, this paper is situated partly in line with 
Sørensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen’s (2013) concept of the “migration 
facilitation industry”, focusing on brokerage and the material and social 
infrastructure that shape migratory mobility, but also recognising that the 
profits and social trust cannot always be separated (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014). 
Brokerage is the process of connecting actors in systems of social, economic or 
political relations in order to facilitate access to valued resources (Stovel & 
Shaw, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012). Brokers often occupy the ‘middle space’ 
between migrants, states and employers. They can act as extensions of the 
state, seeking to outsource border controls and colluding with employers to 
cheapen and commodify migrant labour (McCollum & Findlay, 2018). Brokers 
can also work on migrants’ behalf, finding ways of circumventing restrictive 
border control policies and practices. 
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With the topic of brokering migratory exits and sustaining cross-border 
mobility, the present paper looks into the brokering practice that involves the 
interplay between different private actors, formal and informal brokers, 
humanitarian and state actors and institutions, including social networks and 
technologies that inform, facilitate and condition the migration process, 
making it self-perpetuating and self-serving (Lin et al. 2017). It also looks into 
how brokering and smuggling practices thrive from and are sustained by a 
continuous process of learning about changing conditions along migration 
routes, including intensification of control and regulatory structures in border 
areas as well as negotiating power relations between migrants and smugglers 
at the three stages of migration process. These three states are: (1) 
recruitment and/or departure; (2) mobility/en route and border crossings and 
(3) settlement at a particular destination (Faist, 2014). 
Methodology of the Study   
The empirical data was collected through three months of fieldwork in 2016 
and 2018 using a conventional qualitative research methodology including in-
depth and informal interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), observations, 
collection of life histories, photographs, extended case studies tracing 
migratory departures, journey and settlement in destination or return and 
circulation. Respondents were selected from workers and actors involved in 
the migration industry. These include five brokers, government officials (two 
border guards and 16 officials/personnel working in migration related 
government offices) and six non-government and international organisations, 
including the IOM and local NGOs engaged in migration management. In 
addition, 25 aspiring migrants, 30 families/households of migrants, 20 
returnees in origin locations (Addis Ababa, Wallo and Hadiya) and 5 migrants 
en route in Metema were interviewed. 
Potential migrants, migrants in transit locations, failed migrants as well as 
returnees were the main targets of this study. This approach helped us to 
deeply explore the roles of migration facilitation actors at the different stages 
of the migration process. Some returnees are aiming to migrate again (either 
to the same destination or to try new destinations), others want to resettle and 
still others have managed to become successful business persons. Some were 
expelled from Sudan while others returned to Ethiopia voluntarily. Both types 
of returnees were interviewed in Metema and Addis Ababa in order to collect 
information about their engagements with the migration facilitation industry 
actors. In addition, stories of migrants’ lived experiences helped us to trace the 
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actual process of migratory journeys, border crossings and their experiences 
in destination locations. As migration decision making (including selection of 
brokers) engages families/households, the study also targeted households of 
migrants.  
Research in archives or policy document analysis was also conducted to 
capture socio-political and legal contexts of migration decisions using the 
services of brokers as well as regulatory infrastructures that shape smuggling 
organisations. Besides the in-depth interviews, five FGD were held with 
aspiring migrants and returnees in the study sites. In the following sections, 
we will explore this further and empirically explain the smuggling operations, 
process of clandestine migratory departures and journey towards the Sudan. 
Results and findings 
Smuggling Organisations and Clandestine Journeys 
As stated earlier, there is a well-established overland migration route that 
links Ethiopia and Sudan (Triulzi, 2013: 235). The route begins in Addis Ababa 
and passes through the towns of Bahir Dar and Gondar and the other major 
transition towns of Metema and Humera (Himora) at the Ethiopian–Sudanese 
border, and leads to Khartoum via the towns of Galabat and Gedaref in Sudan. 
Some people from the Tigray Region and Gondar exit via Humera in the 
northern part of the Ethiopian–Sudanese border. These migration routes and 
delaloch networks link villages and towns in Ethiopia with Khartoum.  
There are generally two ways of facilitating an overland journey: delaloch 
gather migrants in Addis Ababa or other bigger cities, such as Jima, Adama and 
Addis Ababa, for a few days and then arrange transport to Khartoum. The 
precise number of delaloch engaged in this migratory process is largely 
unknown. Some sources estimate that more than a thousand migration 
delaloch live in Addis Ababa alone and hundreds live in transition towns and 
villages (Abebaw, 2013; IGAD, 2013; Ayalew, 2017). The individuals working 
with these delaloch, whom migrants call ‘the  bosses’ (that is, lead brokers), sit 
in Khartoum, from where they access leqamiwoch (recruiters or collectors), 
ashagariwoch (transporters), kezaignoch (those who keep migrants in hidden 
places/houses en route) and teqebayoch (receivers in destination) along the 
stated routes.  
These bosses are former Eritrean and Ethiopian migrants who occasionally 
work with Sudanese and Libyan smugglers, known as semsari, and have 
agents in Europe and Saudi Arabia as well. Migrants’ testimonies indicate that 
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the bosses sometimes organise overland journeys via Libya to Italy and then 
Scandinavia or by air directly from Sudan or via Saudi Arabia to Europe with 
help from Sudanese semsari. The ‘bigger bosses’ in Khartoum have several 
nicknames and many of them are from the Eritrean and Ethiopian Tigray 
ethnic group. Some names frequently mentioned by interlocutors are Kibrom, 
Ephrem, Wedi German (son of Germany), Wedi Asab (son of Asab) and Yishaq, 
indicating Tigrigna origin. This is due to the long and established history of 
clandestine migration facilitations from Eritrea, which the smugglers from 
these ethnic groups have capitalised on for a long time (Ayalew, 2017). 
The bosses’ agents, known as leqamiwoch, move inside villages and 
neighbourhoods in towns and convince young men and women to take the 
journey before finally sending them to the ashagari in Addis Ababa. From 
Addis Ababa, another ashagari collects the migrants and sends them to the 
border towns, such as Metema or Humera, where the next ashagari assists 
them to cross the border before he hands them over to a Sudanese transporter, 
who then takes them to Khartoum. However, not only cross-border delaloch 
networks but also cross-border kinship obligations and other significant 
actors located in relevant spaces organise the irregular overland exits and 
journey towards Sudan. In most cases, potential migrants collect the names 
and addresses of reliable delala or recruiters in origin locations and border 
areas from friends and family members in Sudan who might have used the 
same routes or delala. The recruiter or local delala first collects the lists of 
potential migrants and then contacts his immediate and ‘smaller boss’ in Addis 
Ababa or Metema and Humera. The smaller bosses contact their ‘mastermind’ 
in Khartoum, who arranges for agents who can bribe the border guards at 
various checkpoints and others who can transport people across borders and 
take them to Khartoum. The ‘bosses’ also decide the appropriate time, 
condition and means of transport. According to the accounts of delaloch and 
migrants collected during our fieldwork, transporters flexibly use a 
combination of public and private transport services.   
Marishet was a 23-year-old woman from Ethiopia. The researcher met her in 
Khartoum in May 2016 while she was in transit to Sudan. She described her 
journey from Addis Ababa to Khartoum and the many people involved in 
getting them from one point to the next. She travelled with her sister after both 
of them had decided to migrate to Sudan. They consulted their brother-in-law 
who put them in touch with a delala named Getachew. Getachew promised to 
get them to Khartoum for 7,500 birr each (about 300 euros), to which they 
agreed. They planned to use her sister’s savings from an earlier stint in Dubai. 
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She promised to repay her sister after she found a job. They then met Getachew 
at the bus station and he accompanied them to Metema where he handed them 
over to two Habeshas [Ethiopians] waiting for them on the outskirts of 
Metema. From this point onwards, the journey became more clandestine and 
dangerous. Marishet stated: 
We passed the checkpoints on two motorcycles, which they rode on the 
side of the roads. From there, we were handed over to a Sudanese man 
who collected us from Habeshas and drove us to his place in a Toyota 
pickup car. He offered us one night of accommodation. For the next two 
days, he drove us through bushes, dust and dirt roads. Finally, he took us 
deep into the bushes near Khartoum, where we joined about 120 
Ethiopian migrants, who were hiding in the bushes and waiting to be 
transported to Khartoum […]. The next day, at midnight, the Sudanese 
came with three minibuses and loaded about 50 people in the cars. After 
long hours of nonstop driving, we entered Khartoum at midnight.  
After arriving in Khartoum, those who had friends and relatives were dropped 
at their houses and others waiting for money to be transferred via hawala by 
their relatives would be held in accommodation arranged by the Sudanese 
delaloch until the money was received. Those who wanted to continue their 
trip to Libya could stay with the delaloch until the next leg of the trip was 
arranged. But those who did not have money to pay for their journey from 
Ethiopia to Sudan entered into a debt agreement with the delaloch and were 
informally introduced to employers in Khartoum or other places in Sudan. 
They would remain under the surveillance of delaloch until they repaid their 
entire debt. 
The above account exemplifies that irregular migratory exits result from 
actions and interactions of various actors and entities. On the one hand, 
feelings of immobility in life, mainly among the young people in current day 
Ethiopia, have partly motivated overland escape, which is facilitated by 
diverse actors, including migrants and non-migrants located in several local 
and transnational spaces. The facilitating agents of migrants’ journeys towards 
Sudan are smugglers that include delaloch and their connectors; technologies 
such as mobile phones and the Internet; family and friendship networks; and 
public transport and road networks that link Sudan and Ethiopia. These have 
become infrastructural moorings of clandestine migratory exits and journeys. 
The interactions of these actors, institutions, networks and objects, which 
condition and facilitate overland exits, reflect the entanglement of complex 
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economic and social forms, material and technological practices and 
smuggling networks. Some of the actors engage for money and others (former 
migrants en route and in diaspora) do so because of cross-border social 
obligations and reciprocal relations. However, recently, the Ethiopian 
government has intensified border controls by introducing strict regulations 
regarding human smuggling practices. Following this, smuggling operations 
become more complex as smugglers dynamically adapt new strategies to 
overcome control structures. The following sections explore this in detail. 
Intensification of Government Controls and Smugglers’ Reactions 
Recently, the Ethiopian government intensified migration control 
infrastructures and regulations following the increased media coverage of the 
suffering of Ethiopian migrants en route and deportations of thousands of 
migrants from various destination locations, mainly Saudi Arabia, which also 
intensified the ongoing anti-government protests in the country (De Regt & 
Tafesse, 2015; Ayalew, 2017). This increased regulation is also backed by the 
EU externalisation of border controls. Via externalisation practices, the EU has 
begun to persuade African states including Ethiopia to “introduce pre-emptive 
measures to deter or prevent their citizens from irregularly migrating to 
Europe, and/or other nationals from doing so by transiting through their 
countries”. In exchange, the EU extends various promises including 
development aid, trade facilitation, foreign investment, and other advantages 
(Gaibazzi et al., 2017: 5–10). The government of Ethiopia has intensely 
engaged in criminalising brokers and portraying migrants as victims of the 
smuggling practices. To that end, proclamations are adopted swiftly and “anti-
human trafficking taskforces” have been established at different layers of the 
bureaucracy targeting the irregular migration facilitators and brokers.  
The Ethiopian government introduced different anti-human smuggling 
legislations. Some of these include the 11th Criminal Bench within the Federal 
High Court (2007), Human Trafficking and Narcotics section in Organized 
Crime Investigation Unit of the Federal Police (2009) and Anti-Trafficking 
Task Force (2011), which were established to curb human trafficking and 
smuggling and combat illegal migration. The anti-human trafficking taskforce 
has been set up at all levels of the administrative tier. Officials from the deputy 
Prime Minister to the district administrators are members of the taskforce. To 
broaden migration control activities, law enforcement, religious leaders and 
traditional leaders have formed an anti-human trafficking committee. 
Checkpoints have been set up in the main migration routes. Brokers have been 
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criminalised and subjected to organised campaign. In the last five years, in two 
districts in Wallo and Hadya provinces, 50 and 62 brokers, respectively, were 
convicted and are serving long prison sentences. 
The Private Employment Agency Proclamation 104/1998 was later amended 
to the 2009 Employment Exchange Service Proclamation 632/2009, which 
holds Private Employment Agencies (PEAs) and employers liable for the 
welfare of employees and states higher bond requirements for licensing. 
Further, the proclamation amendment was argued to have caused a decline in 
licensed PEAs (from 110 in 2009 to 54 in 2010) and pushed some PEAs into 
the business of illegal brokerage (Fernandez, 2017). The new anti-human 
smuggling proclamation (proclamation 909/2015) even introduced tougher 
regulations and punishments on those engaged in human smuggling and 
trafficking in person. In 2013, the Ethiopian government banned any labour 
migration to Middle Eastern countries until agreements were reached with 
respective countries on the protection of migrant workers (De Regt & 
Taafesse, 2015; Zewdu, 2018). Following this, the north-western route 
towards Europe via Sudan became popular. Smugglers diversified their 
migration facilitation strategies and new actors joined the facilitation industry. 
In other words, as it is elaborated below, intensification of control 
infrastructures have not stemmed clandestine migratory exits; rather, they 
have increased costs, risks and the number of migration facilitation actors, as 
smugglers dynamically and creatively design new routes and strategies to 
overcome barriers.  
Diversification of Exit Routes and Strategies  
The Metema-Galabat border has been the main exit route for migrants along 
the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. However, after the recent intensification of 
border controls in the area, migrants cross the border and enter into Sudan by 
using remote desert routes. According to information from government 
officials and residents of Metema town, there are different desert routes in 
Metema, woreda, that have emerged to serve as major gateways to Sudan. 
Some of the desert routes found in Metema are Doleo, Meka, Shinfa, Korjamos, 
Workamba, Chilga, Dambia, Ganda and Arbajira.  Migrants pay high costs to 
brokers to enter into Sudan using these desert routes:  from 7,000 to 12,000 
Ethiopian birr (Zeyneba, 2017). Previously, it cost approximately 2,000 
Ethiopian birr (Ayalew, 2017). 
Those migrants who are coming from Eritrea and Somaliland often use the 
Doleo Desert route, which is found to be one of the most dangerous desert 
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routes in the woreda. In this regard, Zeyneba (2017) stated that in 2016, a car 
holding 24 migrants from Somaliland (18 male and 6 females) were caught 
while they were trying to cross the border to enter into Sudan through the 
Doleo Desert. Moreover, in addition to the above stated desert routes, where 
the government intensified controls, numerous other unknown desert routes 
are found by smugglers in order to facilitate migrants’ clandestine entry into 
Sudan. In addition, since the Ethiopian government recently tightened border 
controls in Metema, the route passing through Humera has become a key 
outlet. The Humera border is used mainly by Eritreans and Ethiopians from 
the northern parts of Ethiopia (Ayalew, 2017). There is also another route via 
Damazin along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. This route is mainly used by 
Ethiopians from Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromiya national and regional 
states to enter Sudan. During our recent fieldwork, we were told that migrants 
were found dead along this route just two months prior due to dehydration in 
the dessert.    
Until 2013, in many migrants sending areas of Ethiopia, brokers openly 
collected money, recruited, transported and hosted migrants in their own safe 
houses. Even the security in certain areas considered them to be creators of 
opportunity. For instance, in one case in Hadiya, a police commissioner 
assigned a guard for a broker. However, now brokers have moved from the 
public scene to underground operations in many parts of Ethiopia. They 
undertake their services via telephone and local representatives. Most of the 
negotiations between brokers and potential migrants are made telephonically. 
Systems of transport have also changed; except in the case of the route from 
Wallo to the Djibouti border where there is no public transportation, 
transporting migrants en masse to the border in a rented car has been 
abandoned. Rather, migrants are told to take public transport by themselves 
until they reach border towns such as Metema. Systems of sheltering have also 
changed. Instead of keeping migrants together, brokers let migrants rent 
rooms by themselves in hotels around the border during journeys.  
The above discussion indicates that intercepting migration routes simply 
increases the costs and risks of migration instead of preventing it. This is 
mainly because, besides other factors, more officials and law enforcement 
joined in the facilitation industry. For instance, during long journeys across the 
desert, migrants (especially female migrants) experience environmental 
hazards, gang rape, shortage of food and water, theft and robbery by criminals 
(Ayalew, 2017; Zeyneba, 2017). In addition, as is elaborated below, tightening 
African Human Mobility Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (December 2018) 
1348 
 
border controls partly increased actors engaged in the facilitation of 
migration.  
Smuggling Becomes Community Enterprise in Border Areas 
According to the informants and researchers’ observations, the social and 
economic lives of Metema town thrives because of migration and contraband 
trade. The town is predominantly populated by returnees, newly arrived 
potential migrants and seasonal labour migrants coming to the large-scale 
commercial sesame farms in the area. Urban dwellers and organisations – such 
as shop owners, hawala  agents, tea and coffee vendors, hotels, shoeshines, 
youth economic associations such as shanta mahber (luggage association) and 
private transport services (buses, Bajaj, tractors and minibuses) – benefit from 
and support brokering practices and clandestine migration. This is because all 
of these social groups generate financial gains by hosting, feeding, guiding and 
transporting migrants, as well as brokering border crossings.   
Abdalla was a sheqaba (local broker) in the town of Metema. During the time 
of interview, in May 2018, he was 35 years old. He had served as a Federal 
Police officer, but later he quit the position and became a sheqaba in Metema 
for five years. He narrated the following: 
Metema town is built by the money from the migrants. Everybody 
participates. Migrants come with money, people in Metema waits for 
that money. Thus, nobody resists. You know why the government cannot 
stop migration? The migrants want to migrate, the people here eagerly 
wait to support them and obtain money. Everybody waits for that money. 
This lady [pointing at a lady cooking food] while cooking food in front of 
her house she may see a strange person walking in the street.  Then, she 
calls someone she knows working as a broker, probably her husband, and 
tells him about the strange person. He immediately comes and 
approaches the stranger. He takes him/her to a place of accommodation. 
There are many houses in the town mainly built to host migrants. This 
person gets money at least by taking the migrant to that accommodation 
place. He puts the migrant in contact with a broker, and gets money 
again.  
Abdalla also added that a shoeshine does the same. A new arrival sits at a 
shoeshine or coffee house and tries to observe the environment. The 
shoeshines and the women who sell coffee report the newcomer to brokers or 
to a sheqaba. A shop keeper does the same. Abdalla stated, “Have not you seen 
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shopkeepers sitting in empty shops, and barber shops? Their incomes from 
the formal businesses would not pay the rent. They just sit there and wait for 
other opportunities”. The “other opportunities” Abdalla refers to include 
migrant smuggling and contraband trade.  
Shop owners might deal with more complex issues. Most of them are in the 
money exchange business. They exchange Ethiopian birr for Sudanese pound, 
or vice versa. The shop owners also engage in informal money transfers 
(hawala). According to informants, many of the shop owners in Metema lived 
in Khartoum. They returned from there. Thus, they know boutique owners in 
Khartoum and work with them in money transfer. In Khartoum, there are 
shops named after the hometown of migrants, such as Jimma Boutique, 
Wallaga Boutique, Gondar Boutique, etc. From Addis Ababa or Jimma, families 
or brokers send money through Ethiopian banks to Metema. The shop owners 
in Metema withdraw the money, change it to Sudanese pound and send it from 
Galabat to Khartoum. There are money transfer shops there. They also use 
mobile banking; the most well-known being ZEIN banking. Migrants also send 
money from Khartoum for their families or payment for a broker through 
these money transfers and brokers use these shop keepers. 
Security and police officers make the importance of their tasks visible by 
intercepting migrants when they are crossing the border clandestinely, 
detaining and deporting them back to their countries of origin. However, some 
officers also trade migrants with brokers and open up checkpoints in exchange 
for bribes. Villagers and peasants also work with brokers and sheqaba. For 
instance, village militias and farmers protect migrants from security and host, 
feed and guide them through safe routes via bushes and forests during 
clandestine crossings. For these services, they demand money from brokers 
and/or smugglers as well as migrants. 
One informant stated: “here we usually say, ‘There is no sheikh and kes [priest] 
in Metema.’ Nobody is holy here. This is not a place anybody prefers to inhabit. 
The weather is harsh… Metema is very hot.” Informants claimed that some 
police spend only nine months in Metema and will be transferred due to the 
difficulty of the weather. As such, they want to get their share before they are 
transferred to another place. Smuggling migrants and contraband are the main 
opportunity for police officers to earn money before leaving.  
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Abdalla spoke about the engagement of local militias as follows:  
There is local militia. The militia is armed. People in this lowland border 
area are armed and are very good in shooting targets. The militia 
members are recruited from the local people. The militia has no salary. 
Some of the militia members are former members of the police or army. 
Some of them live in rented houses. So, what is their source of income? 
They are the brokers. For the lead brokers also, it is much better to 
connect to the militia than to the police. The militia members are local 
people. They know the route much better than the police. Especially 
recently, when the migrants are coming in a big group, we are using the 
militia and it has become common. They fight with the police. The police 
usually run away. 
The Engagement of Unemployed Youth – The Sheqaba 
The key actors that facilitate border crossings in the town of Metema are 
sheqaba. Literally, sheqaba denotes unemployed young men and women. 
Sheqaba play multiple roles as local brokers in facilitating clandestine 
migration. Abdalla stated the following: 
When busses arrive, the sheqaba populate the bus station. Some are sent 
by lead brokers. The main broker do not come out and make himself 
visible. He hides in somewhere and work by phone calls or send his agents 
to collect migrants from bus station. Some other sheqabas are hunting 
for migrants who have not found broker yet, or whose broker is late to 
arrive. The sheqaba approach those who have no broker and connect 
them with a lead broker they know. Then they get share in the income 
based on their negotiation. In case, the migrants already have a broker, 
who is late to receive them, either the sheqaba snatch [migrant theft is 
common] them and pass them to another broker whom they favor or call 
the original broker and negotiate a term of sharing as they are the 
rescuers, and of course they can also threaten him as he is illegal 
broker…We [sheqabas] also monitor the presence of police; the presence 
of security guys. We monitor the border and provide information to the 
lead brokers. We also monitor the smuggling routes. We look for 
migrants who are crossing to the Sudan. We know the routes. 
Some sheqabas are formally organised by the government. For instance, the 
luggage association, which is locally referred in Amharic as shanta mahber, 
also work as brokers. They are formally registered with the government. The 
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luggage association has 108 members. Their main task is facilitating legal 
migrants to transit the town. They are organised to support the migrants who 
come with visas. They pick up migrants who have visas from the bus station, 
transport them by bajaji with protection from abuse by illegal brokers, guide 
them to shelters, facilitate currency exchange in the black market, photocopy 
travel documents for them and take their passports to the immigration office. 
In a way, their task is to relieve some of the burden from the immigration 
office. However, some individual members are also main players in migrant 
smuggling. Most of them compete with sheqabas and work as intermediaries 
for lead brokers that facilitate clandestine crossings. Hence, the sheqabas call 
the luggage association the government sheqaba. The luggage association also 
have a bad public reputation, as they exploit migrants by demanding extra 
payments. 
Smuggling is Embedded in Cross-Border Trade 
Smuggling operations are embedded within and rely on cross-border informal 
trade and mobility. For instance, there is a main road that passes through the 
town of Metema and extends to Khartoum via Galabat on the Sudanese side. 
Here, there is formal and informal cross-border trade of people and goods. 
Lorries, buses and minibuses transport goods and people between Ethiopia 
and Sudan via the town of Metema using this road. This back and forth flow of 
contraband goods and people is accompanied by a flow information and 
knowledge about clandestine migratory mobility and transitions. Brokers on 
both sides of the border use kinship, friendship and religious, ethnic and 
business ties to facilitate informal money transfers for hosting and 
transporting migrants as well as for bribing officers to open up check points. 
Brokers simultaneously use both formal and informal currency exchange and 
money transfer systems. For instance, hawala agents use formal banks and 
mobile banking by means of Ethiopian and Sudanese telephone lines and SIM 
cards.  
For instance, at the Ethiopian-Sudanese border, there is a bridge that 
separates two border towns (Metema on the Ethiopian side and Galabat on the 
Sudanese side) that has been serving as a gateway for migrants to enter into 
Sudan. It is also one of the major routes for Ethiopian migrants who legally 
enter into Sudan using a short-term visiting visa or the Sudanese ID known as 
the Tasrih. This route is also open for the residents of Metema and Galabat 
towns who visit the market centers during the day to exchange goods and 
services.  
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Though the Tasrih is used primarily by the residents of both border towns, it 
is also used by migrants who disguise themselves as residents of either 
Metema or Galabat to cross the border and enter Sudan. Brokers arrange the 
Tasrih for Ethiopian migrants from Galabat. With these Sudanese IDs, 
migrants can meet Sudanese employers at Galabat who help them to move to 
Khartoum (Zeyneba, 2017).  
Some migrants try to cross the main gate and bridge by disguising themselves 
as residents of Metema, while others wait for a suitable time to cross the 
bridge, such as at night or during market days in Galabat or in Metema when 
the guards are not around. These migrants then hide themselves in the huts 
found in Suk El-Galabat (the market place at Galabat) and travel further into 
Sudanese territory through the desert on foot or on lorries or other means of 
transportation. Many female migrants pass the main gate by wearing a tob 
(veil) commonly worn by Sudanese women. Once they cross the border, they 
contact the Sudanese broker and travel to Khartoum by car through the forest. 
Since the border area is covered with dense but uninhabited bushes, it is 
conducive for the brokers and smugglers to transport migrants into Sudan via 
these bushes and easily bypass checkpoints (Zeyneba, 2017). 
The above discussion exemplifies that in order to continue with clandestine 
crossings in the face of increasing border controls, the generation and sharing 
of knowledge about particular transition nodes is necessary. Migrants and 
smugglers collectively produce information about how to use visibility and 
invisibility strategies in order to circumvent immobility regimes in the border 
areas. This indicates that the border areas are not merely sites where the state 
exercises its sovereign power by way of implementing border control 
regulations, but it is also a site where translocal and transnational social and 
economic relations thrive. This is mainly due to the continuous back and forth 
flow – both legally and illegally – of people, information and goods across 
international borders. Consequently, facilitating clandestine migration across 
the border sustains – despite intensifications of regulations and control 
structures – since it is embedded within and operates in relation to the stated 
cross-border mobilities and relations.   
Conclusions 
The preceding discussions and analysis have demonstrated that human 
smuggling and brokering of clandestine migratory exits is embedded in and 
functions within broader translocal and transnational social, cultural and 
economic relations. This challenges the view reflected in popular discourses 
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that such smuggling is organised by independent criminal organisations. 
Smugglers and their intermediaries facilitate Ethiopian migrants’ clandestine 
border crossings via the town of Metema by mobilising support and resources 
from local communities along the border, bribing border guards and 
capitalising on their ethnic, religious and economic connections in the 
Ethiopian-Sudanese borderlands. Thus, human smuggling has become a 
community enterprise. It is deeply integrated into the economic lives of the 
lowland poverty-stricken border areas. Brokers have made the migration 
industry accessible to the local people. The control structure does not carry 
the same economic incentives. Thus, brokering thrives – amidst the 
intensification of regulatory and control infrastructures – as it enjoys 
community approval and support. Migration facilitation actors navigate 
expectations of the community by creating opportunities for transnational 
mobility for migrants and by sharing the benefits of smuggling with various 
sections of the society, mainly in border areas. They also simultaneously 
navigate regulatory and control structures by designing various strategies to 
circumvent border controls. Thus, the system of control structures reproduces 
a dynamic system of migration facilitation infrastructures. 
More specifically, brokering migratory exits thrives despite intensifications of 
control infrastructures because of the production and reproduction of 
knowledge within the smugglers and migrants’ transnational networks. They 
continuously generate new knowledge and information about ways of 
recruiting migrants and transporting them via safe routes as well as ways of 
money transfer and payment strategies. This knowledge is shared with 
relevant facilitation actors and migrants using mobile phones and online 
communications. In other words, the entanglement of social and smuggling 
networks, communication technology and the production and reproduction of 
knowledge constitute the backbone of the migration facilitation industry in 
general and the infrastructure of contemporary clandestine migratory 
mobility in particular. The production and sharing of this migration 
knowledge also entail unequal power relations between migrants and 
smugglers. Those who have knowledge and the means of mobility – the 
smugglers and local community along the border areas – have more power 
than migrants. Thus, capitalising on this knowledge, some of them perpetrate 
violence toward and exploitation of migrants on the move. Therefore, 
intensifications of border controls do not stop clandestine migration; rather 
they increase risks, costs and vulnerabilities of migration as more actors join 
to organise migration and migrants are forced to take longer unsafe routes.  
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